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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 10 October 1981


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10 October 1981
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Appro	ved For Release 200	8/12/30 : CIA-RDP83	Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
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Po	oland: Regime Rea	ction		3
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		25/1	Top Secret	25X1
			10 October 1981	



Approved For Release 2008/12/30 : CIA-RDP83T0029	96R000400030043-8	
	Top Secret	25X1
EGYPT: Security Precautions		
Egyptian security forces are on alert to tion of the unrest in Asyut, but no other seri problems have developed so far.		25 <b>X</b> 1
Military and police forces are be- watchful in Cairo, where there were two incidents on Thursday. In Asyut the re have quelled the Islamic fundamentalist reportedly killed 75 policemen in two of	o small terrorist egime claims to t terrorists who	25X1
President-designate Moubarek is control reassure Egypt's allies of his communications.		25 <b>X</b> 1
President Sadat's policies.	concile to rother	25X1
Israelis Watchful		
Moubarek yesterday met with Israel Begin, and the Israelis appear cautious Moubarek's initial support for the Camp	sly encouraged by David negotia-	
tion process and the peace treaty. The Moubarek's interview with an Israeli ne have calmed initial Israeli apprehension of his commitment to Sadat's peace policy.	ewspaper seem to on about the dept	25X1
		05)/4
Nevertheless, the Israeli leadersh cerned about Moubarek's longer term aboute power.		25X1
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	10 October 1981	

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## Soviets Keeping Door Open

Soviet media are repeating Arab calls for Sadat's successors to repudiate his policies. These include statements from Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, as well as from PLO leader Arafat and former Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazli. The Soviets, however, have not carried the most offensive comments of some Arab leaders, nor are they gloating over the assassination.

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Moscow has indirectly criticized Moubarek by pointing to Washington's and Tel Aviv's "satisfaction" with his reaffirmation of Sadat's policies. At the same time, the Soviets have been careful to keep the door open to Cairo, stating that the USSR "has always been a supporter of friendly and equitable cooperation with Egypt."

25X1

Moscow is claiming that Sadat's assassination caused "nervous shock" and "veritable pandemonium" in Washington. Some articles charge that the US, through its alert of some military forces in the area, is using Sadat's death to increase its "crude interference in Arab affairs."

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
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10 October 1981


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POLAND: Regime Reaction		
Warsaw's guarded response to Solidarity's party moderates will try to maintain their policy with the union at next week's Central Committee	y of negotiating	25X1
A commentary in the party newspaper criticized the program as excessively br to dismiss some of its political points It claimed that Poles would reject "emptimplementing "constructive" solutions.	oad, but seemed as rhetoric.	25X1
By quoting with approval Walesa's a disassociate himself from groups engaged politicking," the commentary reinforced to portray intellectuals and union advis authors of the political planks of the S formas not being in the union's mainst	in "obvious regime efforts ersthe presumed olidar <u>ity plat-</u>	
Some party members want to restrict union negotiations to strictly economic propose diluting the union's impact by e consultation process in which the major including the Church, the other existing the veterans organizations—would also p Central Committee may also be asked to t cipline by forcing members to choose bet in Solidarity and the party, a move that drastic decline in party membership.  Moscow appears still to be digestin of the Solidarity congress, and is perhaweek's Polish party plenum before voicin tive judgment. TASS has not repeated it that the program adopted by the congress	issues. Others stablishing a interest groups "parties" and articipate. The ighten party dis- ween membership would lead to a  g the results ps awaiting next g any authorita- s initial charge was "counter-	25X1
revolutionary," and yesterday again conf repeating criticism of Solidarity made by tions. It quoted a Polish weekly that c "moderates" and "radicals" in Solidarity power and that blamed the union's boldne ness, errors, and inconsistency" of Poli	y Polish publica- laimed both aim to seize ss on the "weak-	25X1
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3	Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
	10 October 1981	

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PALESTINIANS: Killing of Fatah Leader  Senior PLO official Majid Abu Sharrar was yesterday, possibly because of his contacts wit		25X1
renegade Palestinian Black June Organiz responsible for the assassination of th tive to Brussels in June and several ot ist attacks in Europe, has claimed cred Abu Sharrar, a central committee member Fatah group and head of the PLO's inforthe highest ranking Palestinian to die	e PLO representa her recent terro it for the killi of the moderate mation office, i	r- ng.
round of factional fighting.  PLO leader Arafat is certain to se Abu Sharrar's death.	ek revenge for	25X1 25X1
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Two Black June members were arrest month in connection with an operation a Fatah organization		t

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